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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 APR 1984

Portions redacted by DIA per 10 USC 424. Refer to OSD.
Declassify subject to OSD review and results of
concurrent CIA review. JDC 25 Feb 14

S-6504/DT-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS), NESA

SUBJECT: Intelligence Appraisal (U)

Reference: DIA Short Order Form, 18 April 1984, Intelligence Memorandum
Request.

1. ~~(S)~~ The following information is supplied in response to the reference.
The task requests Soviet air-to-air missile (AAM) intelligence to aid in
assessing the advisability of releasing the U.S. AIM-9M/SIDEWINDER to the
Government of Israel (GOI). Specific issues in the request are:

- a. Comparison of Soviet and U.S. AAM technology in the AIM-9L/AIM-9M
area.
- b. Soviet AAM technology estimate for the 1980-1990 period and what might
be transferred to the direct confrontation states.
- c. Impact assessment on Soviet/Syrian AAM capabilities resulting from
Soviet exploitation of AIM-9M in 1987 in case of inadvertent loss.
- d. Israel's qualitative edge over confrontational states if GOI had only
AIM-9L through 1990 or was provided the AIM-9M in 1987.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ Issue a.: DIA understands the difference between the AIM-9L and
AIM-9M missiles to be the addition of a flare rejection capability in the AIM-
9M. The Soviets probably have similar capability (as well as chaff rejection
with semi-active radar seekers) in the larger AA-6 and AA-7 missiles, although
the performance of these counter-countermeasures (CCM) are not known at this
time. DIA does not assess the smaller AA-2 (similar in size to the U.S.
SIDEWINDER) to currently have this type of CCM technology, but it will
probably be incorporated in the 1988-1992 time frame.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviets probably have variants of the AA-2d which are roughly
equivalent to the AIM-9L in seeker sensitivity, giving them a viable head-on
capability. This, along with the CCM and limited head-on capability of the
AA-7d means the Syrians and other confrontational states have potential access
to missiles similar to the AIM-9L with additional CCM capabilities.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ Issue b.: The Soviets are expected to incrementally improve their
AAM inventory through 1990 with better seeker sensitivity, CCM features, as
well as other technological aspects. They will probably deploy AA-2 type
missiles with AIM-9M (or slightly better) capabilities by 1990. Exportation

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of this technology to direct confrontational states in the Middle East will depend largely upon the performance of Soviet weaponry deployed in the area during conflicts leading up to the 1990's. Current indications are that new weapons will be exported soon after they are deployed in the Soviet Union, especially if Soviet advisors are involved in the client countries.

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ Issue c.: Since the Soviets will probably have AIM-9M type performance incorporated in their AAMs by the late 1980's, the primary impact of an inadvertant loss of that missile to the Soviets would be to permit development of effective countermeasures to the AIM-9M, thereby reducing its effectiveness.

6. ~~(S/NF)~~ Issue d.: The Soviets have exported to Middle Eastern confrontational states aircraft currently assessed to have IR countermeasures (i.e., flares). This would indicate an already reduced capability for GOI AIM-9L missiles in air combat. Based on expected Soviet improvements in aircraft flare capabilities, a continuing degradation of Israeli air-to-air capability can be expected until IR CCM technology is introduced.

7. ~~(S/NF)~~ There has already been a marked improvement in the quality of Soviet exported weapons to many client countries, especially in the Middle East. This trend is expected to continue, even to the extent of the Soviets risking the loss of some weapons to the West for exploitation.

8. (U) Point of contact for this information is [REDACTED]

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Weapons and
Systems Division

DIA

5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C § 424

OSD

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